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DOCTRINAL REDUNDANCY AND THE TWO
PARADOXES OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Robin J. Effron*

INTRODUCTION
The quandaries in modern American personal jurisdiction jurisprudence
are myriad. The overarching question, “why is personal jurisdiction doctrine
such a mess?” has been a guarantor of full employment for civil procedure
professors for decades,1 and the subsidiary questions are also well worn.
What is the relationship between personal jurisdiction and constitutional due
process?2 What is the relationship between personal jurisdiction and venue?3
Between personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens?4 Between
personal jurisdiction and notice?5 Why has the federal government chosen
via Rule 4(k) to rely heavily on the states for the content of the scope of
personal jurisdiction?
A broader question lies at the heart of many of these inquiries: what is
personal jurisdiction for, and are we asking personal jurisdiction to do the
work that either is or should be done by other doctrines? Stated differently,
one might ask: is personal jurisdiction redundant of other procedural
doctrines? Or are other doctrines redundant of personal jurisdiction?
Professor Ingrid Wuerth’s Article, The Due Process and Other
Constitutional Rights of Foreign Nations (“Constitutional Rights of Foreign
Nations”),6 offers the opportunity to focus on an important but often
overlooked side of personal jurisdiction redundancy, that is, the extent to
which constitutional personal jurisdiction does (or does not) occupy some
common space with doctrines of foreign sovereign immunity.
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Thanks to Michael Cooper for excellent research

assistance and to Dean Michael Cahill for support from the Dean’s Summer Research Fund.

1. See Adam N. Steinman, Access to Justice, Rationality, and Personal Jurisdiction, 71
VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1403 n.2 (2018) (citing the major personal jurisdiction articles over the
past few decades).
2. See generally Jay Conison, What Does Due Process Have to Do with Jurisdiction?,
46 RUTGERS L. REV. 1071 (1994).
3. See Scott Dodson, Plaintiff Personal Jurisdiction and Venue Transfer, 117 MICH. L.
REV. 1463 (2019).
4. See Maggie Gardner, Retiring Forum Non Conveniens, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 390 (2017).
5. See Robin J. Effron, The Lost Story of Notice and Personal Jurisdiction, 74 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 23 (2018).
6. Ingrid Wuerth, The Due Process and Other Constitutional Rights of Foreign Nations,
88 FORDHAM L. REV. 633 (2019).
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Constitutional Rights of Foreign Nations is an important and
comprehensive contribution to the civil procedure and foreign relations law
literatures. With regard to procedure, it advances the debate about personal
jurisdiction and due process along two key axes. First, it documents the
extent to which foreign states have been excluded from the protections of the
due process rights to resist the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Professor
Wuerth then constructs an elegant argument for including foreign states as
the subjects of personal jurisdiction due process protection under the U.S.
Constitution and then uses that reasoning to make larger points about the
relationship between personal jurisdiction as a due process protection and
personal jurisdiction’s role in Article III’s allocation of power to the federal
courts. Professor Wuerth highlights personal jurisdiction7 as a core site of
judicial attention to the due process status of foreign states under the U.S.
Constitution, and she rightly argues that
[a]s foreign states and foreign state-owned enterprises expand their
commercial activities and engage with the United States in new ways,
especially in the cyber, terrorism, and economic-espionage contexts,
litigation against them is increasing in scope and importance. Questions
about their constitutional status, which to date have been litigated mostly
in the context of personal jurisdiction, are likely to assume greater
significance in many additional contexts, including in criminal
prosecutions of corporations owned by foreign states.8

This is an important observation. Much of the attention paid to the
transnational complications in personal jurisdiction has centered around the
problem of non-resident alien defendants whose due process protections have
been strengthened to the point that American litigants have trouble suing such
defendants in a convenient forum state or in any American forum at all,9 a
problem that I have called the “non-resident alien paradox.”10 Far less
attention has been given to the equally paradoxical result that when the nonresident alien defendant is a foreign state, the due process protections for
personal jurisdiction fall to zero.11 In this brief Essay, I argue that both
paradoxes share a conceptual origin: the problem of redundancy in
constitutional personal jurisdiction doctrine. To do so, I highlight the parallel
stories of personal jurisdiction and foreign sovereign immunity that Professor
Wuerth weaves throughout her Article. Considering these two stories in the
same space gives further evidence of the extent to which personal jurisdiction
overlaps with other procedural doctrines. But it also shows how the peculiar
7. Professor Wuerth also addresses the associated notice doctrines. Id. at 668 (“Notice
was often described as a fundamental aspect of ‘judicial’ power.”).
8. Wuerth, supra note 6, at 636.
9. See William S. Dodge & Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and Aliens, 116 MICH.
L. REV. 1205 (2018).
10. Robin J. Effron, Solving the Nonresident Alien Due Process Paradox in Personal
Jurisdiction, 116 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 123 (2018).
11. See Wuerth, supra note 6, at 647 (criticizing recent doctrine as requiring “courts to
draw a constitutional distinction between foreign corporations and foreign states”).
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historical path of each doctrine can mask the extent of the shared space and
thus delay a reckoning with the extent and consequences of the overlap.
One problem with personal jurisdiction redundancy is the extent to which
courts have stubbornly refused to acknowledge much of the overlap or take
seriously the implications of redundancy.12 This lack of engagement is partly
responsible for the double paradox of extraterritorial personal jurisdiction
where private alien defendants seem to enjoy greater constitutional
protections than domestic defendants, while their sovereign counterparts are
granted the least of them all.13 My thesis here is not mutually exclusive with
the many other theories and explanations of the scope and provenance of
constitutional personal jurisdiction doctrine. But there is a particular
doctrinal history to tell here. By the time that personal jurisdiction had come
to occupy some serious shared space with several other procedural doctrines,
the lack of engagement both furthered the detachment of the doctrines and
solidified much of the redundancy.
At several junctures, scholars have wondered what constitutional personal
jurisdiction doctrine can and should add to procedural doctrines that regulate
access to courts and parties’ amenability to suit in U.S. jurisdictions, and
procedural doctrines that sort lawsuits into geographically suitable or
appropriate locations. Professor Wuerth’s Article invites us to refocus on the
question of what doctrines can and should regulate the amenability of foreign
sovereigns (as well as the agencies and instrumentalities of foreign
sovereigns) to suit in American courts.
I. THE ORIGINS OF REDUNDANCY IN PERSONAL JURISDICTION
In the first century of the republic, personal jurisdiction was largely an
affair of state law, with its origins in natural law, the “general law,” and
international law principles of comity.14 The federal constitutional
dimensions of personal jurisdiction were limited to questions of full faith and
credit and other structural federalism concerns.15
The affirmative
requirements for personal jurisdiction came in the form of state statutory and
common law rules for service of process—this was how personal jurisdiction
12. There are in fact ways in which personal jurisdiction redundancy may be problematic
on its own terms, but I decline to take up that larger issue in this short Essay.
13. Cf. Aaron D. Simowitz, Legislating Transnational Jurisdiction, 57 VA. J. INT’L L. 325,
372 (2018) (“[I]t makes little sense to draw dramatic distinctions between sovereigns and
private parties when the entire structure of the FSIA is premised upon the principle that, when
sovereigns act like private parties, they will be treated like private parties.”).
14. See Wuerth, supra note 6, at 668; see also Stephen E. Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right, 95
TEX L. REV. 1249, 1252 (2017) (arguing against “the main holding of Pennoyer: that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause . . . imposes rules for personal jurisdiction”);
Effron, supra note 5, at 30 (2018) (observing that, prior to Pennoyer, courts approached
personal jurisdiction primarily as a limit on a court’s authority—one grounded “first and
foremost in notions of territoriality”).
15. See Effron, supra note 5, at 30; Roger H. Trangsrud, The Federal Common Law of
Personal Jurisdiction, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 849, 850–84 (1989).
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was “perfected” and it also served the purpose for fulfilling the natural and
general law requirements of notice of the pendency of an action.16 The law
of service of process served multiple purposes, but it would be a stretch to
say that personal jurisdiction itself was redundant of other procedural
doctrines, at least not in any significant way.
It was not until Pennoyer v. Neff17 that personal jurisdiction became a
doctrine, national in scope, that was meant to “do” something, although the
identity of that “thing” was unclear at the time of Pennoyer and remains the
subject of intense debate through the modern era. In Pennoyer, the Supreme
Court held that impermissible exercises of personal jurisdiction by state
courts were in fact due process violations of the Fourteenth Amendment.18
Here was born the personal jurisdiction redundancy problem: if personal
jurisdiction was, in fact, a feature of constitutional due process, what is the
“process” in personal jurisdiction that is due to the defendant? By the end of
nearly 150 years of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, the Supreme Court
was struggling to articulate what personal jurisdiction itself had to offer
beyond the constitutional enforcement of the territorial limitations of the
power of a forum state.19
Although the due process question is ostensibly connected to a standard of
“reasonableness,”20 the attempt to define what sort of exercise of personal
jurisdiction is constitutionally unreasonable has not produced anything
approaching a clear or workable standard. One reason for this is that courts
and commentators have had some difficulty in answering the due process
nexus question in a manner that is not duplicative of other procedural
doctrines, both constitutional and rule-based. Once personal jurisdiction
became “A Thing” under the Fourteenth Amendment, courts needed to know
what it was “for” in order to locate or justify the due process violation.
Although one can identify Pennoyer as the conceptual origin of personal
jurisdiction redundancy, this puzzle remained relatively submerged until the
Supreme Court announced the minimum contacts test as the due process
standard for personal jurisdiction in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.21
The Pennoyer rule required personal, in-hand service of process, mostly
within the territory of the forum state.22 Efforts to push the boundaries of the
16. See Effron, supra note 5, at 30–31.
17. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
18. Id. at 733.
19. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017).
20. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477–78 (1985); see also Wendy
Collins Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction and
Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 WASH. L. REV. 479, 510–18 (examining and questioning the link
between due process and several putative interests addressed by personal jurisdiction
doctrine).
21. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
22. See RHONDA WASSERMAN, PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 207–61 (2004) (history and status of due process doctrine for
personal jurisdiction).
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Pennoyer rule with substituted service or service outside the territory of the
forum state centered around cases that seemed to fit within Pennoyer’s
exceptions, such as in rem proceedings,23 or efforts to expand the
jurisdictional reach of states with aggressive uses of explicit and implied
consent to suit in the forum state.24 But, for the most part, the preInternational Shoe cases maintained the Pennoyer framework, which was
largely consistent with the older general law and comity framework with the
additional veneer of due process as the doctrinal hook for the idea of a
constitutionally based outer limit on the exercise of jurisdiction.
The International Shoe minimum contacts standard opened up a world of
long-arm jurisdiction possibilities. The minimum contacts test itself was
borne of frustration with trying to discern the territorial “presence” of an
ever-increasing number of non-natural defendants (mainly corporations),
transacting business and engaging in other actions within and across any
number of jurisdictions beyond their state of organization or primary
business operations. The minimum contacts test freed courts from the rigid
and often artificial territoriality of Pennoyer. But it generated a new set of
questions about the constitutional grounding of personal jurisdiction.
In the seven decades since the Court announced the minimum contacts test,
various theories of personal jurisdiction and its relationship to minimum
contacts and due process have gone in and out of vogue.25 Among the many
criticisms of the Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence are the claims
that personal jurisdiction in general and the minimum contacts test in
particular are duplicative of other procedural doctrines or procedural tools—
procedural devices that are, perhaps, better suited to addressing the various
concerns that courts and commentators have voiced. The rules of venue and
doctrine of forum non conveniens are tools to sort cases into geographically
sensical forums.26 The rules of service of process and constitutional
dimensions of notice address the concerns of how and when to reach the
defendant and inform it of the pendency of a lawsuit.27 Underlying
substantive law can or should be constructed and interpreted so as not to
23. See Effron, supra note 5, at 36–47 (analyzing the following exceptions to the rigid
Pennoyer regime: in rem cases, cases involving marital status, cases involving service of
process on state officials in their capacity as agents for corporations, cases involving consent
to a forum state’s jurisdiction, and in personam out-of-state service, i.e. when a resident of a
state is served with process to appear in their home state while they are currently out of state).
24. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356–57 (1927).
25. See Effron, supra note 5, at 35 n.36 (collecting scholarly articles on the history and
theories of personal jurisdiction).
26. See Christopher D. Cameron & Kevin R. Johnson, Death of a Salesman?: Forum
Shopping and Outcome Determination under International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 769,
841 (1995) (“Rather than having venue become increasingly reliant on jurisdiction doctrine, a
more sensible approach might be for the jurisdictional rules to mirror the federal venue statute,
or the state law equivalents.”); John T. Parry, Introduction: Due Process, Borders, and the
Qualities of Sovereignty—Some Thoughts on J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 16 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 827, 855 (2012).
27. See Effron, supra note 5, at 31, 38.
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surprise a defendant that it is subject to suit in a forum state.28 Or, substantive
contract law is an able vehicle for determining the effect of a forum selection
clause.29
This redundancy has further complicated the project of discerning the
purposes and scope of constitutional personal jurisdiction, but it has also
muddied the waters of some of the other doctrines mentioned above.
Perhaps, for example, it is forum non conveniens that is in need of rethinking,
and not (only) personal jurisdiction.30 The overall effect, though, is worth
noting. The redundancy of constitutional personal jurisdiction doctrine
creates somewhat of a ping pong effect in which critics of one doctrine can
point to the existence of the other in order to promote the demise of the
disfavored doctrine. For example, it is reasonable to critique either forum
non conveniens doctrine or personal jurisdiction doctrine for failing to
properly or consistently allocate cases fairly or efficiently to different
geographical forums. But shoring up those arguments by pointing to the
other doctrine as “backup” has had the odd effect of bolstering the existence
of both.
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONAL
JURISDICTION AND FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DOCTRINES
This brings us to an important thread woven throughout Professor
Wuerth’s Article, a story that deserves special attention. Running alongside
Professor Wuerth’s elegant description of and argument about the
constitutional status of foreign sovereigns as viewed through the lens of
personal jurisdiction and due process, is the story of foreign sovereign
immunity. As other scholars have already noted, the current law governing
foreign sovereign immunity, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
(FSIA), “muddles the traditional ways one thinks about subject matter
jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and immunity.”31

28. Cf. Todd David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
101, 153 (2010) (criticizing the personal jurisdiction “notice of suit” theory as circular because
of its dependence on the existence of jurisdiction in the first place and its relationship to the
underlying substantive law).
29. The Supreme Court has increasingly favored a federal, procedural approach to the
enforceability of forum selection clauses rather than a searching look at whether underlying
state contract law would permit such enforcement. See generally Adam N. Steinman, Atlantic
Marine Through the Lens of Erie, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 795 (2015) (arguing that, despite Supreme
Court support for the enforcement of forum selection clauses, federal courts should defer to
state law on this issue).
30. See Gardner, supra note 4, at 429 (suggesting that forum non conveniens is redundant
with several existing doctrines including personal jurisdiction).
31. Linda J. Silberman & Aaron D. Simowitz, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments and Awards: What Hath Daimler Wrought?, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 344, 369 (2016);
see also Graham C. Lilly, Jurisdiction over Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L. REV.
85, 120–22 (1983) (discussing the relationship between subject matter jurisdiction, personal
jurisdiction, and foreign sovereign immunity).
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The question of whether and when foreign states (and their associated
subdivisions or instrumentalities) are immune from suit in American courts
has a history as long as that of personal jurisdiction. But because of the early
structure and scope of each doctrine, the potential for overlap simply did not
manifest itself until the modern era. I will return to the implications of this
redundancy in Part III. What follows here is a brief outline of how foreign
sovereign immunity has interacted and then overlapped with issues of
jurisdiction.32
Sovereign immunity is actually a collection of doctrines that govern when
a litigant can bring an action against a government, or a governmental agency
or instrumentality.33 In the United States, the sovereign immunity of
domestic sovereigns is governed by the U.S. Constitution and assorted
statutes that waive immunity.34 The immunity of foreign sovereigns from
suit is not governed by the Constitution.35 This absence, however, does not
imply that foreign sovereign immunity is a new or exceptional doctrine. At
the time of the founding, the litigation immunity of foreign sovereigns was
well-recognized. Courts operated under the presumption that sovereign
immunity applied unless the lawsuit fell into one of the established
exceptions, such as consent.36
During the time period that roughly corresponds to the pre-Pennoyer era
through International Shoe, the sovereign immunity of foreign states meant
“absolute immunity.” Under absolute immunity, foreign governments that
the U.S. deemed “friendly sovereigns” were granted the same absolute
immunity as domestic sovereigns, and the executive branch, through the
State Department, requested immunity in all actions against friendly
sovereigns.37 Like the early personal jurisdiction doctrines, absolute
immunity was grounded, in part, in international law principles of comity.
Absolute immunity, which was fairly categorical and largely controlled by
the executive branch, kept excessive litigation over the scope of foreign
sovereign immunity at a relatively low level. Recall that the pre-Pennoyer
32. Much of this history is covered throughout Professor Wuerth’s Article. My goal here
is to draw out this story for special consideration on its own terms.
33. Foreign sovereign immunity actually concerns both when foreign states are subject to
suit and when actions to enforce judgments can be brought against them. For purposes of this
Essay, I refer generally to immunity from suit.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. See, e.g., N.Y. CT. CL. ACT §§ 8–12 (McKinney 2019)
(waiving immunity and consenting to be sued pursuant to the requirements of the N.Y. Court
of Claims Act); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.28(1) (West 2017) (waiving immunity for government
entities in certain situations).
35. Sovereign immunity is currently governed by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA), Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332,
1391, 1441, 1602–1611 (2012)).
36. See The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 125 (1812) (noting
that in areas where “sovereignty is concerned,” there is no implied assent to a foreign court’s
jurisdiction).
37. 15A Martin A. Redish, Moore’s Federal Practice § 104.02 (2019); Republic of Austria
v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 689 (2004) (noting that, until 1952, the Executive Branch followed
a policy of requesting immunity in all actions against foreign sovereigns).
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and Pennoyer regimes of personal jurisdiction had a similar effect—litigation
about the scope of constitutional personal jurisdiction coalesced around the
Pennoyer exceptions.
Thus, these two forces converged to minimize litigation of the larger
questions concerning the scope of foreign sovereign immunity. Territorially
centered bases of personal jurisdiction (both pre- and post-Pennoyer), would
have seriously limited the number of cases that plaintiffs on American soil
attempted to bring against foreign sovereigns and governments. Combined
with the doctrine of absolute immunity, this legal landscape meant that courts
did not confront these questions with the regularity that we have come to
experience in the modern era.
Just as personal jurisdiction changed significantly in the mid-twentieth
century, so did foreign sovereign immunity. The legal, economic, and social
conditions that led to these changes have been well-documented. In short,
by the end of World War II, the United States was a modern, interconnected
economy in which parties conducted more and more business and other
activities at a distance and across state and international borders. A strict
territorial jurisdictional regime proved frustrating, resulting in the twin due
process revolutions of International Shoe, which established minimum
contacts as the constitutional test for in personam jurisdiction, and Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,38 which governed the due process
standard for notice. These cases significantly broadened a forum state’s
ability to assert personal jurisdiction over absent defendants, particularly
with regard to non-natural persons whose physical “presence” within a forum
was difficult to articulate.
Foreign sovereign immunity doctrine was also in need of reform because
the theory of absolute immunity was becoming difficult to reconcile with the
myriad ways in which foreign states and state-owned enterprises engaged in
widespread commercial activity. In 1952, the State Department issued the
“Tate Letter,” in which it informed the Attorney General that the State
Department, in deciding whether to advise in favor of or against a grant of
sovereign immunity, would abandon the absolute theory of sovereign
immunity in favor of the “restrictive theory of sovereign immunity,” under
which “the immunity of the sovereign is recognized with regard to sovereign
or public acts (jure imperii) of a state, but not with respect to private acts
(jure gestionis).”39 This shift aligned the United States with several other
nations that had already adopted the restrictive theory. As the Second Circuit
succinctly asserted:
[t]he purpose of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity is to try to
accommodate the interest of individuals doing business with foreign
governments in having their legal rights determined by the courts, with the

38. 339 U.S. 306.
39. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, to Philip B. Perlman,
Acting Attorney Gen. (May 19, 1952), in 26 DEPT. OF STATE BULL. 984–85 (1952).
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interest of foreign governments in being free to perform certain political
acts without undergoing the embarrassment or hindrance of defending the
propriety of such acts before foreign courts.40

These mid-century changes, then, are of a piece, characterized by a
recognition that the older, more rigid rules did not accord with modern
economic reality. This new era of procedural due process and of restrictive
sovereign immunity brought neither closure nor clarity to these doctrines.
Within just a few years of International Shoe, the Supreme Court began its
decades-long odyssey to define the scope and theoretical basis for the
minimum contacts test and its relationship to due process.41 Restrictive
sovereign immunity, for its part, was similarly volatile. The State
Department purported to make its decisions of immunity recommendations
based on the substantive criteria of restrictive immunity. In reality, however,
many decisions continued to be politically motivated.42 Although the
purpose of the new approach was to accommodate the changing economic

40. Victory Transp. Inc. v. Comisaria Gen., 336 F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir. 1964).
41. See generally Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017)
(holding that a defendant must have sufficient contact with the forum state in connection with
the claim at bar for jurisdiction); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014) (holding that
a subsidiary’s minimum contacts with a forum cannot be imputed to the parent company to
obtain jurisdiction); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011) (holding that
the defendant must intend, through its actions, to submit to the power of the sovereign for
jurisdiction to be proper); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915,
919 (2011) (holding that a parent company’s minimum contacts with a forum state cannot by
imputed to a subsidiary for purposes of obtaining jurisdiction and that, for a court to have
general jurisdiction over a company, it must be “essentially at home in the forum State.”);
Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (holding that placing an
item into the “stream of commerce” alone is insufficient to confer jurisdiction); Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (holding that a contract alone was insufficient to
confer jurisdiction, one must look at the circumstances holistically and determine the
defendant purposefully targeted the forum); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770
(1984) (holding that, because the plaintiff was injured every time a magazine was sold,
jurisdiction was proper in all forums where the magazine was available); Calder v. Jones, 465
U.S. 783 (1984) (holding that intent to cause harm in the forum state is sufficient to grant
jurisdiction); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (holding that
foreseeability of litigation in a forum state is insufficient without other contacts and
introducing “fairness factors” for help in determining whether jurisdiction would be proper);
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (holding that the minimum contacts test also applies
to in rem actions); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) (holding that a plaintiff’s unilateral
action is insufficient to confer jurisdiction over a defendant); McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355
U.S. 220 (1957) (holding that one contact can be sufficient for personal jurisdiction depending
on the circumstances).
42. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983) (the application of
the restrictive theory “proved troublesome”); see also Clinton L. Narver, Putting the
“Sovereign” Back in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: The Case for a Time of Filing
Test for Agency or Instrumentality Status, 19 B.U. INT’L L.J. 163, 169 (2001) (over time, “the
State Department’s policy of making formal suggestions of immunity transformed the foreign
sovereign immunity determination from a predominantly ‘legal’ determination into a
predominantly ‘political’ determination wherein the Executive determined the rights of
plaintiffs and foreign states alike on a case-by-case basis”).
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and legal realities of the twentieth century, restrictive immunity proved
unwieldy.43
The difficulties in administering and adjudicating restrictive immunity
culminated in the FSIA. Like the history of personal jurisdiction, the FSIA
has been the subject of exhaustive scholarly consideration.44 In brief, the aim
of the FSIA was to shift the process of determining foreign sovereign
immunity to the federal courts,45 thus depoliticizing such decision-making,46
but codifying “for the most part . . . the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity.”47 The FSIA codified the main exceptions to foreign sovereign
immunity: express and implied waiver,48 substantial commercial activity
that is either conducted in or causes a direct effect in the United States,49 and
an assortment of other exceptions including noncommercial torts, unlawful
expropriation, and arbitration agreements.50
Since its passage in 1976, the FSIA has been amended and interpreted in
a way that, in effect, narrows immunity and broadens the scope of claims for
which foreign states (and their agencies and instrumentalities) are subject to
suit.51 This narrowing of foreign sovereign immunity coincides with the latetwentieth-century era of personal jurisdiction in which the Supreme Court
has, for the most part, developed an increasingly narrow approach to the
scope of minimum contacts. This leads to the potentially troubling result that
Professor Wuerth identifies in her Article: at the time when foreign states
are the least protected by foreign sovereign immunity, they are left in a
personal jurisdiction lurch because of the series of cases in which the
Supreme Court and lower courts have held that foreign states are not persons
within the meaning of the due process clauses for purposes of personal
jurisdiction.52 This is not to suggest that the default norm should be that of
protecting foreign sovereigns from suit. It does, however, raise troubling
43. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Claims Against Foreign States—a Proposal for Reform of
United States Law, 44 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 901, 909–12 (1969).
44. See generally Lee M. Caplan, The Constitution and Jurisdiction over Foreign States:
The 1996 Amendment to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in Perspective, 41 VA. J. INT’L
L. 369 (2001); William R. Dorsey, III, Reflections on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
After Twenty Years, 28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 257 (1997); Karen Halverson, Is a Foreign State a
“Person”? Does it Matter?: Personal Jurisdiction, Due Process, and the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 115, 119–29 (2001); Robert B. von Mehren, The
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 33 (1978).
45. The FSIA also has a subject matter jurisdiction component, codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1330.
46. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 685 (1981) (“The principal purpose of
the FSIA was to codify contemporary concepts concerning the scope of sovereign immunity
and withdraw from the President the authority to make binding determinations of the sovereign
immunity to be accorded foreign states.”).
47. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488.
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (2019).
49. Id. § 1605(a)(2).
50. Id. § 1605(a)(5), (6).
51. Wuerth, supra note 6, at 640.
52. Wuerth, supra note 6, at 648–49.

2019] DOCTRINAL REDUNDANCY AND THE TWO PARADOXES

127

questions when foreign states, as a category, seem excluded from the baseline
protections enjoyed by domestic and non-state foreign defendants alike.
III. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN THE LARGER CONTEXT OF
PERSONAL JURISDICTION REDUNDANCY
Professor Wuerth identifies the primary contemporary reason for the
exclusion of foreign states from the due process protections of personal
jurisdiction, namely, that courts have refused to define foreign states as
persons within the meaning of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
U.S. Constitution. The FSIA itself has a complicated relationship to both
personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction.53 Although it governs
when a foreign state is amenable to suit, personal jurisdiction must be
established separately. The FSIA cannot create personal jurisdiction where
it does not exist constitutionally. Her historical and doctrinal arguments that
this conclusion is erroneous are thorough and provocative, particularly her
argument that the structure and early understanding of the scope of judicial
power under Article III of the Constitution extends to in personam
jurisdictional power over foreign sovereigns. In this Essay, however, I want
to highlight the role that personal jurisdiction redundancy plays in this story.
The ways in which personal jurisdiction and foreign sovereign immunity
are redundant of one another should, by now, be obvious. Each doctrine
implicates, at some level, due process (or the lack thereof) and separation of
powers.54 Each doctrine addresses, at least in part, restrictions on the
amenability of a party to the jurisdiction of a territorial sovereign. Each
doctrine has a historical tradition of allowing the party to consent. And, in
each doctrine, courts and legislators have struggled to accommodate the
competing considerations of modern commercial realities with limits of state
territorial power. In fact, as one commentator has noted, the FSIA “nexus
requirement usually ensures that assertions of personal jurisdiction under the
FSIA satisfy due process requirements.”55
But, over the past four decades, consideration of each doctrine has been
relatively siloed. The legislative and judicial expansion of the FSIA
exceptions unfolded, for the most part, without explicit regard to the “foreign
state” gap in personal jurisdiction into which many of these defendants would
fall. Similarly, one would expect the judicial personal jurisdiction discourse,
which has become so solicitous of the supposed horrors of territorial

53. See 15A Martin H. Redish, Moore’s Federal Practice § 104.06 (2019) (“The FSIA
conflates the usually distinct questions of sovereign immunity, subject matter jurisdiction, and
personal jurisdiction . . . .”).
54. Wuerth, supra note 6, at 680 (discussing “[t]he redundancy between separation of
powers and due process” in the constitutional protection of foreign states).
55. Victoria A. Carter, God Save the King: Unconstitutional Assertions of Personal
Jurisdiction Over Foreign States in U.S. Courts, 82 VA. L. REV. 357, 363 (1996).
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overreach, to be especially sensitive to the interests of foreign nations.56 But,
as we have seen, the opposite has been true.
I believe that this is due to implicit assumptions that arise from personal
jurisdiction redundancy. There might be an unexamined or unstated belief
that the question of the amenability of foreign states (as well as their agencies
and instrumentalities) is not “really” a personal jurisdiction question at all,
but solely a question of foreign sovereign immunity. This intuition is what
gets clumsily translated into the argument that foreign states are not persons
within the meaning of due process. And, of course, my argument here flies
in the face of the several cases which hold that personal jurisdiction over
foreign state defendants is a separate question to be answered after the
determination that the defendant is not immune from suit under the FSIA. In
other words, how could courts and commentators have an intuition that
foreign sovereign immunity is the “real” limit on the amenability of foreign
states to be sued in federal court when they simultaneously make explicit
demands that the requirements of constitutional personal jurisdiction must
also be fulfilled?
There is not a satisfactory doctrinal or theoretical answer to this question
(at least as of now) because the conundrum is born of a lack of clarity in the
relationship between personal jurisdiction and any number of other doctrines
including foreign sovereign immunity. The current gap that Professor
Wuerth addresses in her Article is yet another example of the “ping pong”
effect that I described earlier in which efforts to dilute, circumscribe, or
eradicate one procedural doctrine are justified, at least in part, by reference
to a different doctrine that should “really” be doing the work of the first. It
is easy to cut foreign states out of personal jurisdiction with the vague notion
that foreign sovereign immunity places appropriate limits on the amenability
of foreign states to suit. And it is similarly easy to broaden the exceptions to
the FSIA when there is solid precedent reminding courts and commentators
that constitutional personal jurisdiction is a separate requirement.
Aside from serving as an example of some of the problems that arise from
redundancy in personal jurisdiction doctrine, there are a few other lessons
about personal jurisdiction and foreign sovereign immunity that can be drawn
from highlighting the parallel histories. First, both stories originate as old
and accepted doctrines that predate the Constitution and have a common
ancestor in international law principles of comity. But despite their ancient
provenance, both doctrines have developed as reactions to actual and
perceived changes in economic and political realities. In both doctrines,
courts have struggled to articulate generally applicable principles that allow
for the necessary exercise of jurisdictional authority over commercial and

56. Cf. Simowitz, supra note 13, at 362 (arguing that Congress should have the “power to
interpret Due Process jurisdiction as it pertains to foreign persons” and that it “should be even
greater . . . where foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities are concerned”).
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other activities that have some connection to the forum state57 without
rendering the idea of territorial jurisdiction itself obsolete. The parallel
histories show the importance of relative baselines. By the 1980s, many
jurists viewed the limits on constitutional personal jurisdiction as too lax and
laid the doctrinal foundations for the restrictive doctrines that have emerged
in the post-2011 cases. But during the same time period, lawmakers and
judges viewed the FSIA as too restrictive, and sought to relax the restrictions
on suing foreign states and, especially, their agencies and instrumentalities.
The background condition of personal jurisdiction redundancy allowed both
of these doctrinal paths to continue without a real dialogue about their mutual
effects.
Second, this juxtaposition is further evidence of the poor fit between
personal jurisdiction and due process. If, as Professor Wuerth suggests,
Congress should take a greater role in defining the due process content of the
constitutional rights of foreign states,58 then it seems like foreign sovereign
immunity, as codified in the FSIA, would be a natural place to start. It is, in
fact, a comprehensive statute in which Congress has specified when foreign
states should or should not be amenable to suit in the United States. A call
to merge foreign sovereign immunity with constitutional personal
jurisdiction is consistent with recent scholarship suggesting that the United
States (rather than the individual states) is the relevant sovereign for cases
brought in federal courts and that the Fifth Amendment is the relevant due
process clause.59 As Professor Simowitz has observed, there is a relationship
between the stubborn commitment to trans-substantivity in civil procedure
and weak congressional involvement in regulating the scope of personal
jurisdiction at the federal level, but he also suggests that “Congress has both
the accountability and the expertise to craft substance specific rules,”60 and
this would include rules for suing foreign sovereigns.
Foreign sovereign immunity and the FSIA are emphatically not
constitutional doctrines.61 If anything, courts typically mention due process
in the FSIA context only to point out that it is a requirement that must be
57. Even if that connection is mostly the result of the plaintiff’s residence, see J. McIntyre
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011) (finding that New Jersey state court lacked
personal jurisdiction over claim brought by New Jersey resident for a workplace injury that
took place in New Jersey), or unilateral conduct, see Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253
(1958) (“[t]he unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident
defendant”); Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014) (affirming and broadening Hanson’s
unilateral activity standard).
58. Wuerth, supra note 6, at 685; see also Simowitz, supra note 13, at 370.
59. See Jonathan Remy Nash, National Personal Jurisdiction, 68 EMORY L.J. 509, 522–
23 (2019) (developing a theory of Fifth Amendment due process protections for personal
jurisdiction).
60. Simowitz, supra note 13, at 380.
61. Cf. Lori Damrosch, Foreign States and the Constitution, 73 VA. L. REV. 483, 522–23
(1987) (arguing that “foreign states are outsiders to the constitutional compact” and that “their
relationship to the United States polity is quite different from that of aliens” who “can be
compelled to comply with United States law”).
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separately satisfied62 and that the current weight of Supreme Court authority
demands the conclusion that foreign states are not protected by due process.63
One possible answer is to stress, as do Professor Wuerth and others, that
Congress has the power to regulate personal jurisdiction both as a statutory
matter and as a matter of defining the due process scope of the doctrine.
Another possible answer to this conundrum is to suggest that courts have
been misguided in their assertions or assumptions that foreign sovereign
immunity, if properly codified or applied, is itself not a satisfaction of due
process. While it is already true that “the FSIA . . . does not relieve courts of
the obligation of protecting the due process rights of foreign state
defendants,”64 the decisions that Congress makes about the amenability of
foreign states to suit could be viewed as a single answer to multiple questions,
namely, (1) how has Congress chosen to codify foreign sovereign
immunity?; (2) how has Congress chosen to affirmatively extend the personal
jurisdiction authority of the United States as sovereign to foreign states?; and
(3) how has Congress chosen to interpret the due process limits of personal
jurisdiction over foreign states? To the extent that a unitary law addressing
the amenability of foreign states to suit addresses all three questions, then
due process is coextensive with foreign sovereign immunity, and it may even
be possibly to imply this unification in a statute like the FSIA without
Congress making the explicit connection.65
Professor Wuerth does not explicitly argue that congressionally codified
foreign sovereign immunity is or could be coextensive with due process.
However, her analysis does point in this direction. While I find this an
intriguing possibility, I would retreat to the safer territory of asserting that
this problem simply adds to the numerous arguments for why personal
jurisdiction should probably be decoupled from due process.
CONCLUSION
Personal jurisdiction redundancy is the result of the significant doctrinal
overlap that I have documented in this brief Essay. Underlying this overlap
are serious disagreements about the theories behind personal jurisdiction:
sovereignty, liberty, territorial control, convenience, and fairness and
reasonableness to the defendant, plaintiff, or both—not to say anything of the
role that due process plays and the question of what due process even means.
The Supreme Court does not appear poised to resolve these debates any time
62. See, e.g., Tex. Trading & Mill. Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 308
(2d Cir. 1981) (overruled by Frontera Res. Azerbaijan Corp. v. State Oil Co. of Azerbaijan
Rep., 582 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2009)).
63. See Frontera Res., 582 F.3d at 395 (“the Due Process Clause’s protections should not
apply to foreign states or their instrumentalities.”).
64. Carter, supra note 55, at 360.
65. However, the FSIA as currently drafted probably defies such implications. Although
it does muddle jurisdiction and sovereign immunity, those doctrines are still distinct within
the statute.
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soon. It might be possible, in the meantime, to patch a few holes where we
can, and the gap between non-resident alien defendants, domestic defendants,
and foreign state defendants might be one such place. Taking advantage of
personal jurisdiction redundancy with foreign sovereign immunity might be
a partial (or temporary) solution, in which a more robust understanding of
what doctrines count as due process (perhaps a statute like the FSIA) and
who is entitled to make such a constitutional interpretation (Congress) would
fill the void of constitutional protection.

